

BPAM 65-0440

25 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCI Responsibility for the Coordination  
and Effective Guidance to the U.S.  
Intelligence Effort

I. Background.

a. Legal Authority.

(1) The National Security Act of 1947 provides ". . . for the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities" of Government departments, that the Central Intelligence Agency will "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" and perform such services of common concern and other duties as the NSC shall direct. CIA is also required to advise and make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of the intelligence activities of the Government.

(2) The National Security Council (NSCID 1 as amended 18 January 1961) has directed that the Director of Central Intelligence ". . . shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." NSCID 1 and other NSCIDs further define the application of the DCI's authority to specific intelligence areas (ensuring that planning for collection and reporting capabilities of individual departments avoid undesirable duplication, etc.).

(3) President Kennedy in his letter of 16 January 1962 identified the DCI as the principal foreign intelligence officer of the Government responsible for the "coordination and

effective guidance of the total U.S. intelligence effort." This letter authorizes and directs the DCI, jointly with the heads of departments and agencies concerned, to maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities "with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication."

2. Implementation.

a. From the beginning the DCI has been under heavy pressure to improve the coordination of intelligence activities. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) urged Allen Dulles to delegate substantial authority over the Central Intelligence Agency in order to free himself to concentrate on coordinating the intelligence community as a whole. Mr. Dulles rejected these recommendations, preferring instead to delegate his coordinating (as opposed to his operating) responsibilities, and appointed General Lucian Truscott to act as his Deputy for Coordination. General Truscott undertook a renegotiation of the various intelligence directives outstanding and accomplished what amounted to a review and realignment of jurisdictional responsibilities of USIB and of participating USIB agencies. He was succeeded by [ ] who served for approximately 18 months as an Assistant to Mr. McCone after the latter's appointment as DCI. During this period the DCI, insofar as his community responsibilities were concerned, continued to be preoccupied with organizational matters, particularly the NRO, and improvements in the functioning and structure of USIB.

b. In September 1963 Mr. McCone decided to create a Deputy and small staff for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE), notifying the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Director, Bureau of the Budget and Mr. McGeorge Bundy that this staff would assist the DCI in the review and evaluation of programs of the intelligence community as a whole. Two factors

which were immediately responsible for this decision were:  
(1) expressions of mounting concern on the part of the Bureau of the Budget and Congress with the accelerating cost of national intelligence (estimated at approximately [redacted] in FY 1964); and (2) some feeling on Mr. McCone's part that his command of facts concerning certain programs of the community was less than adequate (specifically, Mr. McCone was dissatisfied with his ability to answer questions posed by Senator Russell concerning intelligence coverage of nuclear events, i. e. [redacted]).

c. NIPE has functioned pretty much as an extension of the DCI's personal office, addressing a number of ad hoc organizational and procedural problems at his specific direction (i. e., the NRO, the USIB committee structure including the Critical Collection Problems Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, the SIGINT Committee, procedures appropriate for periodic reporting on reconnaissance activities, the adequacy of existing procedures for estimating nuclear developments, etc.). NIPE has also:

(1) Jointly with Dr. Fubini's office conducted an elaborate review of SIGINT requirements;

(2) Afforded representation for the DCI in the Secretary of Defense's budgetary review of DoD intelligence programs such as CIP (intelligence activities under the cognizance of DIA) and the CCP (SIGINT);

(3) Undertaken a series of surveys of representative intelligence activities (i. e., the [redacted] Reports).

### 3. The Future.

As a practical matter, the DCI's coordinating activity can be roughly divided between responsibility for

a. What might be called jurisdictional coordination;

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b. Requirements; and

c. Program review.

a. Jurisdictional Coordination.

By this is meant such things as the coordination of espionage operations under DCID 5/1 or the allocation of responsibility for the publication of items of current intelligence in the respective bulletins of CIA and DIA. This responsibility of the DCI can be largely discharged through the established directorates of CIA. The DDP, for example, can do most of the coordinating under DCID 5/1. Experience has suggested, however, that a representative acting on behalf of the DCI, in his community as distinguished from his CIA capacity, can contribute to the solution of problems in this category, due to a certain objectivity and the level of attention which such a representative can bring to bear.

b. Requirements.

Obviously one of the better ways to improve and rationalize intelligence activity is to make sure that no duplication exists in requirements which are issued for the collection, processing or analysis of information and that all such requirements serve a useful purpose. Control over the validation of intelligence requirements is therefore an effective approach to coordination. This approach, however, is obscured by semantic difficulties surrounding the definition of what a "requirement" is. A requirement can be understood as meaning a need for certain information. Often, however, it is used to connote the need for an activity (clandestine operations to penetrate a particular government) or a system (a SIGINT satellite). Much can undoubtedly be done to clarify and streamline the intelligence effort by pruning and screening requirements. This responsibility is performed by individual agencies (particularly DIA and CIA) and by USIB committees. A small

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staff, however, functioning on behalf of the DCI, can contribute to efforts to improve the focus and eliminate duplication in intelligence requirements by initiating ad hoc investigations and reviews in this field.

c. Program Review.

(1) Of Individual Programs.

The effectiveness with which individual programs (CIP, CCP, CIA, NRP) are reviewed and evaluated has vastly improved in the course of the past four years. The DCI participates in the review of those programs which are the particular responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and arrangements should be continued to ensure that the Secretary of Defense receives DCI/CIA views on the emphasis appropriate for individual programs conducted by the Defense Department. Unquestionably the Secretary of Defense will wish to receive definitive recommendations, through appropriate DoD staff channels, concerning the levels of effort and resources which should be allocated to programs which are his managerial responsibility -- (CIP and CCP). Representation in the review of these DoD programs by the DCI can be accomplished through regular staff components of CIA (the SIGINT officer, O/BPAM, etc.). A DCI staff, exclusively concerned with community affairs, can, however, be useful in consolidating a "DCI" view in this connection and DCI/CIA representation is probably more effective if conducted through such a staff. Moreover, if the DCI is to continue to have responsibility for the "effectiveness and efficiency" of the intelligence programs of the community, he should continue to have an independent staff qualified to conduct individual surveys to assess segments of the community effort. The size and scope of NPIC is an example of an upcoming problem of concern to the community and the DCI.

(2) Of the Totality of the Community Effort.

The development of procedures and a methodology for reviewing and evaluating the U. S. intelligence effort

judged as a whole presents very considerable difficulties. Steps have been taken to improve the DCI's ability to assess the over-all intelligence effort against particular targets. We have fortified the competence and authority of the CCPC, for example, to examine and recommend improvements in our ability to concentrate all collection resources against a critical area. No procedure, however, now exists for the simultaneous review of all programs of the Government in the foreign intelligence field and formidable obstacles exist to any such collective review. For one thing, there are serious mechanical problems to be faced in assembling information relating to the total intelligence effort in a single consolidated presentation. For perfectly legitimate reasons, the intelligence activities carried on by DIA or the Armed Services show up in the CIP under entirely different categories than those which are used, for example, by CIA in projecting roughly comparable activities. A consolidated presentation of all U. S. intelligence activities accordingly involves either a change in the reporting procedures now in effect in the Defense Department to make them compatible with the categories used by CIA or vice versa. The present NIPE staff is inadequate to undertake a presentation of this character and would have to be expanded.

Despite these objections, the DCI's obligation to conduct effective reviews of the intelligence effort can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only if he is able to see the totality of this effort. Moreover a consolidated "overview" of intelligence resources, presented in appropriate categories, would seem to be an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of a 15 year plan for the development and utilization of these resources, as proposed by the DCI. A presentation of the essential elements of the community effort can be devised in broad categories which indicates dollar and

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manpower allocations to particular targets or functions. Such a presentation can probably be assembled by a relatively small staff with the assistance of the existing components of intelligence agencies. Its presentation could be so timed that general findings resulting from such reviews would constitute guidance for the budget preparation of individual agencies.

4. Recommendations.

It is recommended that:

a. A small staff serving the Director in his community capacity be continued for the purposes indicated in paragraphs 3 a, b, and c (1) above.

b. That the feasibility and desirability of attempting a consolidated presentation of community programs, as suggested in paragraph 3 c (2), be discussed, possibly in conjunction with the proposed 15 year projected plan, with appropriate representatives of State, Defense and the Bureau of the Budget.

*How about CIR?*

/s/ John A. Bross

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

cc: DDCI  
ExDir-Comptroller

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*FROM DCS  
37 May*

Examples of Support Objectives Relating to Assumptions

Assumption

Gradual proliferation of abrasive crises in small war situations stimulated variously by communism, nationalism, racism, and radicalism.

Examples of Support Objectives

Faster and more flexible telecommunications through circuit redundancy which minimizes the dependence on any single facility.

Increased use of automated relay equipment in order to speed up the flow of communications traffic.

Hardware for clandestine agent TV-type document transmission systems.

Assumption

Communist China acquires both increased stature and influence in Asia and the world, and a modest nuclear missile capability.

Example of Support Objective

Improved Agency capability for Chinese language training.

Assumption

Local armed clashes increase in the world.

Example of Support Objective

Improved Agency quick-reaction capability through automated qualification records and more flexible personnel procedures.



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
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